1065 lines
42 KiB
Plaintext
1065 lines
42 KiB
Plaintext
#
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# This is the "master security properties file".
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#
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# An alternate java.security properties file may be specified
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# from the command line via the system property
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#
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# -Djava.security.properties=<URL>
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#
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# This properties file appends to the master security properties file.
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# If both properties files specify values for the same key, the value
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# from the command-line properties file is selected, as it is the last
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# one loaded.
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#
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# Also, if you specify
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#
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# -Djava.security.properties==<URL> (2 equals),
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#
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# then that properties file completely overrides the master security
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# properties file.
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#
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# To disable the ability to specify an additional properties file from
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# the command line, set the key security.overridePropertiesFile
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# to false in the master security properties file. It is set to true
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# by default.
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# In this file, various security properties are set for use by
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# java.security classes. This is where users can statically register
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# Cryptography Package Providers ("providers" for short). The term
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# "provider" refers to a package or set of packages that supply a
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# concrete implementation of a subset of the cryptography aspects of
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# the Java Security API. A provider may, for example, implement one or
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# more digital signature algorithms or message digest algorithms.
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#
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# Each provider must implement a subclass of the Provider class.
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# To register a provider in this master security properties file,
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# specify the provider and priority in the format
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#
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# security.provider.<n>=<provName | className>
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#
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# This declares a provider, and specifies its preference
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# order n. The preference order is the order in which providers are
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# searched for requested algorithms (when no specific provider is
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# requested). The order is 1-based; 1 is the most preferred, followed
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# by 2, and so on.
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#
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# <provName> must specify the name of the Provider as passed to its super
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# class java.security.Provider constructor. This is for providers loaded
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# through the ServiceLoader mechanism.
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#
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# <className> must specify the subclass of the Provider class whose
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# constructor sets the values of various properties that are required
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# for the Java Security API to look up the algorithms or other
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# facilities implemented by the provider. This is for providers loaded
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# through classpath.
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#
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# Note: Providers can be dynamically registered instead by calls to
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# either the addProvider or insertProviderAt method in the Security
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# class.
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#
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# List of providers and their preference orders (see above):
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#
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security.provider.1=SUN
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security.provider.2=SunRsaSign
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security.provider.3=SunEC
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security.provider.4=SunJSSE
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security.provider.5=SunJCE
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security.provider.6=SunJGSS
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security.provider.7=SunSASL
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security.provider.8=XMLDSig
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security.provider.9=SunPCSC
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security.provider.10=JdkLDAP
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security.provider.11=JdkSASL
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security.provider.12=SunPKCS11
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#
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# A list of preferred providers for specific algorithms. These providers will
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# be searched for matching algorithms before the list of registered providers.
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# Entries containing errors (parsing, etc) will be ignored. Use the
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# -Djava.security.debug=jca property to debug these errors.
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#
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# The property is a comma-separated list of serviceType.algorithm:provider
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# entries. The serviceType (example: "MessageDigest") is optional, and if
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# not specified, the algorithm applies to all service types that support it.
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# The algorithm is the standard algorithm name or transformation.
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# Transformations can be specified in their full standard name
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# (ex: AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding), or as partial matches (ex: AES, AES/CBC).
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# The provider is the name of the provider. Any provider that does not
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# also appear in the registered list will be ignored.
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#
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# There is a special serviceType for this property only to group a set of
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# algorithms together. The type is "Group" and is followed by an algorithm
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# keyword. Groups are to simplify and lessen the entries on the property
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# line. Current groups are:
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# Group.SHA2 = SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224, SHA-512/256
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# Group.HmacSHA2 = HmacSHA224, HmacSHA256, HmacSHA384, HmacSHA512
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# Group.SHA2RSA = SHA224withRSA, SHA256withRSA, SHA384withRSA, SHA512withRSA
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# Group.SHA2DSA = SHA224withDSA, SHA256withDSA, SHA384withDSA, SHA512withDSA
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# Group.SHA2ECDSA = SHA224withECDSA, SHA256withECDSA, SHA384withECDSA, \
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# SHA512withECDSA
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# Group.SHA3 = SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512
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# Group.HmacSHA3 = HmacSHA3-224, HmacSHA3-256, HmacSHA3-384, HmacSHA3-512
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#
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# Example:
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# jdk.security.provider.preferred=AES/GCM/NoPadding:SunJCE, \
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# MessageDigest.SHA-256:SUN, Group.HmacSHA2:SunJCE
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#
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#jdk.security.provider.preferred=
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#
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# Sun Provider SecureRandom seed source.
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#
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# Select the primary source of seed data for the "NativePRNG", "SHA1PRNG"
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# and "DRBG" SecureRandom implementations in the "Sun" provider.
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# (Other SecureRandom implementations might also use this property.)
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#
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# On Unix-like systems (for example, Solaris/Linux/MacOS), the
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# "NativePRNG", "SHA1PRNG" and "DRBG" implementations obtains seed data from
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# special device files such as file:/dev/random.
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#
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# On Windows systems, specifying the URLs "file:/dev/random" or
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# "file:/dev/urandom" will enable the native Microsoft CryptoAPI seeding
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# mechanism for SHA1PRNG and DRBG.
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#
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# By default, an attempt is made to use the entropy gathering device
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# specified by the "securerandom.source" Security property. If an
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# exception occurs while accessing the specified URL:
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#
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# NativePRNG:
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# a default value of /dev/random will be used. If neither
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# are available, the implementation will be disabled.
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# "file" is the only currently supported protocol type.
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#
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# SHA1PRNG and DRBG:
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# the traditional system/thread activity algorithm will be used.
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#
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# The entropy gathering device can also be specified with the System
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# property "java.security.egd". For example:
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#
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# % java -Djava.security.egd=file:/dev/random MainClass
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#
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# Specifying this System property will override the
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# "securerandom.source" Security property.
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#
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# In addition, if "file:/dev/random" or "file:/dev/urandom" is
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# specified, the "NativePRNG" implementation will be more preferred than
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# DRBG and SHA1PRNG in the Sun provider.
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#
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securerandom.source=file:/dev/random
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#
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# A list of known strong SecureRandom implementations.
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#
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# To help guide applications in selecting a suitable strong
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# java.security.SecureRandom implementation, Java distributions should
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# indicate a list of known strong implementations using the property.
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#
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# This is a comma-separated list of algorithm and/or algorithm:provider
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# entries.
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#
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securerandom.strongAlgorithms=NativePRNGBlocking:SUN,DRBG:SUN
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#
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# Sun provider DRBG configuration and default instantiation request.
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#
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# NIST SP 800-90Ar1 lists several DRBG mechanisms. Each can be configured
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# with a DRBG algorithm name, and can be instantiated with a security strength,
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# prediction resistance support, etc. This property defines the configuration
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# and the default instantiation request of "DRBG" SecureRandom implementations
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# in the SUN provider. (Other DRBG implementations can also use this property.)
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# Applications can request different instantiation parameters like security
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# strength, capability, personalization string using one of the
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# getInstance(...,SecureRandomParameters,...) methods with a
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# DrbgParameters.Instantiation argument, but other settings such as the
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# mechanism and DRBG algorithm names are not currently configurable by any API.
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#
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# Please note that the SUN implementation of DRBG always supports reseeding.
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#
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# The value of this property is a comma-separated list of all configurable
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# aspects. The aspects can appear in any order but the same aspect can only
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# appear at most once. Its BNF-style definition is:
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#
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# Value:
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# aspect { "," aspect }
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#
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# aspect:
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# mech_name | algorithm_name | strength | capability | df
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#
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# // The DRBG mechanism to use. Default "Hash_DRBG"
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# mech_name:
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# "Hash_DRBG" | "HMAC_DRBG" | "CTR_DRBG"
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#
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# // The DRBG algorithm name. The "SHA-***" names are for Hash_DRBG and
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# // HMAC_DRBG, default "SHA-256". The "AES-***" names are for CTR_DRBG,
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# // default "AES-128" when using the limited cryptographic or "AES-256"
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# // when using the unlimited.
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# algorithm_name:
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# "SHA-224" | "SHA-512/224" | "SHA-256" |
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# "SHA-512/256" | "SHA-384" | "SHA-512" |
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# "AES-128" | "AES-192" | "AES-256"
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#
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# // Security strength requested. Default "128"
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# strength:
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# "112" | "128" | "192" | "256"
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#
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# // Prediction resistance and reseeding request. Default "none"
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# // "pr_and_reseed" - Both prediction resistance and reseeding
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# // support requested
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# // "reseed_only" - Only reseeding support requested
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# // "none" - Neither prediction resistance not reseeding
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# // support requested
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# pr:
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# "pr_and_reseed" | "reseed_only" | "none"
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#
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# // Whether a derivation function should be used. only applicable
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# // to CTR_DRBG. Default "use_df"
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# df:
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# "use_df" | "no_df"
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#
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# Examples,
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# securerandom.drbg.config=Hash_DRBG,SHA-224,112,none
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# securerandom.drbg.config=CTR_DRBG,AES-256,192,pr_and_reseed,use_df
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#
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# The default value is an empty string, which is equivalent to
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# securerandom.drbg.config=Hash_DRBG,SHA-256,128,none
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#
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securerandom.drbg.config=
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#
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# Class to instantiate as the javax.security.auth.login.Configuration
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# provider.
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#
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login.configuration.provider=sun.security.provider.ConfigFile
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#
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# Default login configuration file
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#
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#login.config.url.1=file:${user.home}/.java.login.config
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#
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# Class to instantiate as the system Policy. This is the name of the class
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# that will be used as the Policy object. The system class loader is used to
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# locate this class.
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#
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policy.provider=sun.security.provider.PolicyFile
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# The default is to have a single system-wide policy file,
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# and a policy file in the user's home directory.
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#
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policy.url.1=file:${java.home}/conf/security/java.policy
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policy.url.2=file:${user.home}/.java.policy
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# whether or not we expand properties in the policy file
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# if this is set to false, properties (${...}) will not be expanded in policy
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# files.
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#
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policy.expandProperties=true
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# whether or not we allow an extra policy to be passed on the command line
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# with -Djava.security.policy=somefile. Comment out this line to disable
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# this feature.
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#
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policy.allowSystemProperty=true
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# whether or not we look into the IdentityScope for trusted Identities
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# when encountering a 1.1 signed JAR file. If the identity is found
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# and is trusted, we grant it AllPermission. Note: the default policy
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# provider (sun.security.provider.PolicyFile) does not support this property.
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#
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policy.ignoreIdentityScope=false
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#
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# Default keystore type.
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#
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keystore.type=pkcs12
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#
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# Controls compatibility mode for JKS and PKCS12 keystore types.
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#
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# When set to 'true', both JKS and PKCS12 keystore types support loading
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# keystore files in either JKS or PKCS12 format. When set to 'false' the
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# JKS keystore type supports loading only JKS keystore files and the PKCS12
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# keystore type supports loading only PKCS12 keystore files.
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#
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keystore.type.compat=true
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#
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# List of comma-separated packages that start with or equal this string
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# will cause a security exception to be thrown when passed to the
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# SecurityManager::checkPackageAccess method unless the corresponding
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# RuntimePermission("accessClassInPackage."+package) has been granted.
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#
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package.access=sun.misc.,\
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sun.reflect.
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#
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# List of comma-separated packages that start with or equal this string
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# will cause a security exception to be thrown when passed to the
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# SecurityManager::checkPackageDefinition method unless the corresponding
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# RuntimePermission("defineClassInPackage."+package) has been granted.
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#
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# By default, none of the class loaders supplied with the JDK call
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# checkPackageDefinition.
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#
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package.definition=sun.misc.,\
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sun.reflect.
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#
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# Determines whether this properties file can be appended to
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# or overridden on the command line via -Djava.security.properties
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#
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security.overridePropertiesFile=true
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#
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# Determines the default key and trust manager factory algorithms for
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# the javax.net.ssl package.
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#
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ssl.KeyManagerFactory.algorithm=SunX509
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ssl.TrustManagerFactory.algorithm=PKIX
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#
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# The Java-level namelookup cache policy for successful lookups:
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#
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# any negative value: caching forever
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# any positive value: the number of seconds to cache an address for
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# zero: do not cache
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#
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# default value is forever (FOREVER). For security reasons, this
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# caching is made forever when a security manager is set. When a security
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# manager is not set, the default behavior in this implementation
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# is to cache for 30 seconds.
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#
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# NOTE: setting this to anything other than the default value can have
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# serious security implications. Do not set it unless
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# you are sure you are not exposed to DNS spoofing attack.
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#
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#networkaddress.cache.ttl=-1
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# The Java-level namelookup cache policy for failed lookups:
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#
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# any negative value: cache forever
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# any positive value: the number of seconds to cache negative lookup results
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# zero: do not cache
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#
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# In some Microsoft Windows networking environments that employ
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# the WINS name service in addition to DNS, name service lookups
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# that fail may take a noticeably long time to return (approx. 5 seconds).
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# For this reason the default caching policy is to maintain these
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# results for 10 seconds.
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#
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networkaddress.cache.negative.ttl=10
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#
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# Properties to configure OCSP for certificate revocation checking
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#
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# Enable OCSP
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#
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# By default, OCSP is not used for certificate revocation checking.
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# This property enables the use of OCSP when set to the value "true".
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#
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# NOTE: SocketPermission is required to connect to an OCSP responder.
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#
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# Example,
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# ocsp.enable=true
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#
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# Location of the OCSP responder
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#
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# By default, the location of the OCSP responder is determined implicitly
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# from the certificate being validated. This property explicitly specifies
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# the location of the OCSP responder. The property is used when the
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# Authority Information Access extension (defined in RFC 5280) is absent
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# from the certificate or when it requires overriding.
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#
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# Example,
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# ocsp.responderURL=http://ocsp.example.net:80
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#
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# Subject name of the OCSP responder's certificate
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#
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# By default, the certificate of the OCSP responder is that of the issuer
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# of the certificate being validated. This property identifies the certificate
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# of the OCSP responder when the default does not apply. Its value is a string
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# distinguished name (defined in RFC 2253) which identifies a certificate in
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# the set of certificates supplied during cert path validation. In cases where
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# the subject name alone is not sufficient to uniquely identify the certificate
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# then both the "ocsp.responderCertIssuerName" and
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# "ocsp.responderCertSerialNumber" properties must be used instead. When this
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# property is set then those two properties are ignored.
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#
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# Example,
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# ocsp.responderCertSubjectName=CN=OCSP Responder, O=XYZ Corp
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#
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# Issuer name of the OCSP responder's certificate
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#
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# By default, the certificate of the OCSP responder is that of the issuer
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# of the certificate being validated. This property identifies the certificate
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# of the OCSP responder when the default does not apply. Its value is a string
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# distinguished name (defined in RFC 2253) which identifies a certificate in
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# the set of certificates supplied during cert path validation. When this
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# property is set then the "ocsp.responderCertSerialNumber" property must also
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# be set. When the "ocsp.responderCertSubjectName" property is set then this
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# property is ignored.
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#
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# Example,
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# ocsp.responderCertIssuerName=CN=Enterprise CA, O=XYZ Corp
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#
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# Serial number of the OCSP responder's certificate
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#
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# By default, the certificate of the OCSP responder is that of the issuer
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# of the certificate being validated. This property identifies the certificate
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# of the OCSP responder when the default does not apply. Its value is a string
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# of hexadecimal digits (colon or space separators may be present) which
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# identifies a certificate in the set of certificates supplied during cert path
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# validation. When this property is set then the "ocsp.responderCertIssuerName"
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# property must also be set. When the "ocsp.responderCertSubjectName" property
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# is set then this property is ignored.
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#
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# Example,
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# ocsp.responderCertSerialNumber=2A:FF:00
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#
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# Policy for failed Kerberos KDC lookups:
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#
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# When a KDC is unavailable (network error, service failure, etc), it is
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# put inside a blacklist and accessed less often for future requests. The
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# value (case-insensitive) for this policy can be:
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#
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# tryLast
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# KDCs in the blacklist are always tried after those not on the list.
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#
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# tryLess[:max_retries,timeout]
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# KDCs in the blacklist are still tried by their order in the configuration,
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# but with smaller max_retries and timeout values. max_retries and timeout
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# are optional numerical parameters (default 1 and 5000, which means once
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# and 5 seconds). Please notes that if any of the values defined here is
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# more than what is defined in krb5.conf, it will be ignored.
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#
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# Whenever a KDC is detected as available, it is removed from the blacklist.
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# The blacklist is reset when krb5.conf is reloaded. You can add
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# refreshKrb5Config=true to a JAAS configuration file so that krb5.conf is
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# reloaded whenever a JAAS authentication is attempted.
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#
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# Example,
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# krb5.kdc.bad.policy = tryLast
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# krb5.kdc.bad.policy = tryLess:2,2000
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#
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krb5.kdc.bad.policy = tryLast
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#
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# Algorithm restrictions for certification path (CertPath) processing
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#
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# In some environments, certain algorithms or key lengths may be undesirable
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# for certification path building and validation. For example, "MD2" is
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# generally no longer considered to be a secure hash algorithm. This section
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# describes the mechanism for disabling algorithms based on algorithm name
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# and/or key length. This includes algorithms used in certificates, as well
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# as revocation information such as CRLs and signed OCSP Responses.
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# The syntax of the disabled algorithm string is described as follows:
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# DisabledAlgorithms:
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# " DisabledAlgorithm { , DisabledAlgorithm } "
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#
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# DisabledAlgorithm:
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# AlgorithmName [Constraint] { '&' Constraint }
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#
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# AlgorithmName:
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# (see below)
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#
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# Constraint:
|
|
# KeySizeConstraint | CAConstraint | DenyAfterConstraint |
|
|
# UsageConstraint
|
|
#
|
|
# KeySizeConstraint:
|
|
# keySize Operator KeyLength
|
|
#
|
|
# Operator:
|
|
# <= | < | == | != | >= | >
|
|
#
|
|
# KeyLength:
|
|
# Integer value of the algorithm's key length in bits
|
|
#
|
|
# CAConstraint:
|
|
# jdkCA
|
|
#
|
|
# DenyAfterConstraint:
|
|
# denyAfter YYYY-MM-DD
|
|
#
|
|
# UsageConstraint:
|
|
# usage [TLSServer] [TLSClient] [SignedJAR]
|
|
#
|
|
# The "AlgorithmName" is the standard algorithm name of the disabled
|
|
# algorithm. See "Java Cryptography Architecture Standard Algorithm Name
|
|
# Documentation" for information about Standard Algorithm Names. Matching
|
|
# is performed using a case-insensitive sub-element matching rule. (For
|
|
# example, in "SHA1withECDSA" the sub-elements are "SHA1" for hashing and
|
|
# "ECDSA" for signatures.) If the assertion "AlgorithmName" is a
|
|
# sub-element of the certificate algorithm name, the algorithm will be
|
|
# rejected during certification path building and validation. For example,
|
|
# the assertion algorithm name "DSA" will disable all certificate algorithms
|
|
# that rely on DSA, such as NONEwithDSA, SHA1withDSA. However, the assertion
|
|
# will not disable algorithms related to "ECDSA".
|
|
#
|
|
# A "Constraint" defines restrictions on the keys and/or certificates for
|
|
# a specified AlgorithmName:
|
|
#
|
|
# KeySizeConstraint:
|
|
# keySize Operator KeyLength
|
|
# The constraint requires a key of a valid size range if the
|
|
# "AlgorithmName" is of a key algorithm. The "KeyLength" indicates
|
|
# the key size specified in number of bits. For example,
|
|
# "RSA keySize <= 1024" indicates that any RSA key with key size less
|
|
# than or equal to 1024 bits should be disabled, and
|
|
# "RSA keySize < 1024, RSA keySize > 2048" indicates that any RSA key
|
|
# with key size less than 1024 or greater than 2048 should be disabled.
|
|
# This constraint is only used on algorithms that have a key size.
|
|
#
|
|
# CAConstraint:
|
|
# jdkCA
|
|
# This constraint prohibits the specified algorithm only if the
|
|
# algorithm is used in a certificate chain that terminates at a marked
|
|
# trust anchor in the lib/security/cacerts keystore. If the jdkCA
|
|
# constraint is not set, then all chains using the specified algorithm
|
|
# are restricted. jdkCA may only be used once in a DisabledAlgorithm
|
|
# expression.
|
|
# Example: To apply this constraint to SHA-1 certificates, include
|
|
# the following: "SHA1 jdkCA"
|
|
#
|
|
# DenyAfterConstraint:
|
|
# denyAfter YYYY-MM-DD
|
|
# This constraint prohibits a certificate with the specified algorithm
|
|
# from being used after the date regardless of the certificate's
|
|
# validity. JAR files that are signed and timestamped before the
|
|
# constraint date with certificates containing the disabled algorithm
|
|
# will not be restricted. The date is processed in the UTC timezone.
|
|
# This constraint can only be used once in a DisabledAlgorithm
|
|
# expression.
|
|
# Example: To deny usage of RSA 2048 bit certificates after Feb 3 2020,
|
|
# use the following: "RSA keySize == 2048 & denyAfter 2020-02-03"
|
|
#
|
|
# UsageConstraint:
|
|
# usage [TLSServer] [TLSClient] [SignedJAR]
|
|
# This constraint prohibits the specified algorithm for
|
|
# a specified usage. This should be used when disabling an algorithm
|
|
# for all usages is not practical. 'TLSServer' restricts the algorithm
|
|
# in TLS server certificate chains when server authentication is
|
|
# performed. 'TLSClient' restricts the algorithm in TLS client
|
|
# certificate chains when client authentication is performed.
|
|
# 'SignedJAR' constrains use of certificates in signed jar files.
|
|
# The usage type follows the keyword and more than one usage type can
|
|
# be specified with a whitespace delimiter.
|
|
# Example: "SHA1 usage TLSServer TLSClient"
|
|
#
|
|
# When an algorithm must satisfy more than one constraint, it must be
|
|
# delimited by an ampersand '&'. For example, to restrict certificates in a
|
|
# chain that terminate at a distribution provided trust anchor and contain
|
|
# RSA keys that are less than or equal to 1024 bits, add the following
|
|
# constraint: "RSA keySize <= 1024 & jdkCA".
|
|
#
|
|
# All DisabledAlgorithms expressions are processed in the order defined in the
|
|
# property. This requires lower keysize constraints to be specified
|
|
# before larger keysize constraints of the same algorithm. For example:
|
|
# "RSA keySize < 1024 & jdkCA, RSA keySize < 2048".
|
|
#
|
|
# Note: The algorithm restrictions do not apply to trust anchors or
|
|
# self-signed certificates.
|
|
#
|
|
# Note: This property is currently used by Oracle's PKIX implementation. It
|
|
# is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
|
|
#
|
|
# Example:
|
|
# jdk.certpath.disabledAlgorithms=MD2, DSA, RSA keySize < 2048
|
|
#
|
|
#
|
|
jdk.certpath.disabledAlgorithms=MD2, MD5, SHA1 jdkCA & usage TLSServer, \
|
|
RSA keySize < 1024, DSA keySize < 1024, EC keySize < 224
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
# Algorithm restrictions for signed JAR files
|
|
#
|
|
# In some environments, certain algorithms or key lengths may be undesirable
|
|
# for signed JAR validation. For example, "MD2" is generally no longer
|
|
# considered to be a secure hash algorithm. This section describes the
|
|
# mechanism for disabling algorithms based on algorithm name and/or key length.
|
|
# JARs signed with any of the disabled algorithms or key sizes will be treated
|
|
# as unsigned.
|
|
#
|
|
# The syntax of the disabled algorithm string is described as follows:
|
|
# DisabledAlgorithms:
|
|
# " DisabledAlgorithm { , DisabledAlgorithm } "
|
|
#
|
|
# DisabledAlgorithm:
|
|
# AlgorithmName [Constraint] { '&' Constraint }
|
|
#
|
|
# AlgorithmName:
|
|
# (see below)
|
|
#
|
|
# Constraint:
|
|
# KeySizeConstraint | DenyAfterConstraint
|
|
#
|
|
# KeySizeConstraint:
|
|
# keySize Operator KeyLength
|
|
#
|
|
# DenyAfterConstraint:
|
|
# denyAfter YYYY-MM-DD
|
|
#
|
|
# Operator:
|
|
# <= | < | == | != | >= | >
|
|
#
|
|
# KeyLength:
|
|
# Integer value of the algorithm's key length in bits
|
|
#
|
|
# Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference
|
|
# implementation. It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other
|
|
# implementations.
|
|
#
|
|
# See "jdk.certpath.disabledAlgorithms" for syntax descriptions.
|
|
#
|
|
jdk.jar.disabledAlgorithms=MD2, MD5, RSA keySize < 1024, \
|
|
DSA keySize < 1024
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
# Algorithm restrictions for Secure Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security
|
|
# (SSL/TLS/DTLS) processing
|
|
#
|
|
# In some environments, certain algorithms or key lengths may be undesirable
|
|
# when using SSL/TLS/DTLS. This section describes the mechanism for disabling
|
|
# algorithms during SSL/TLS/DTLS security parameters negotiation, including
|
|
# protocol version negotiation, cipher suites selection, peer authentication
|
|
# and key exchange mechanisms.
|
|
#
|
|
# Disabled algorithms will not be negotiated for SSL/TLS connections, even
|
|
# if they are enabled explicitly in an application.
|
|
#
|
|
# For PKI-based peer authentication and key exchange mechanisms, this list
|
|
# of disabled algorithms will also be checked during certification path
|
|
# building and validation, including algorithms used in certificates, as
|
|
# well as revocation information such as CRLs and signed OCSP Responses.
|
|
# This is in addition to the jdk.certpath.disabledAlgorithms property above.
|
|
#
|
|
# See the specification of "jdk.certpath.disabledAlgorithms" for the
|
|
# syntax of the disabled algorithm string.
|
|
#
|
|
# Note: The algorithm restrictions do not apply to trust anchors or
|
|
# self-signed certificates.
|
|
#
|
|
# Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation.
|
|
# It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
|
|
#
|
|
# Example:
|
|
# jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms=MD5, SSLv3, DSA, RSA keySize < 2048
|
|
jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms=SSLv3, RC4, MD5withRSA, DH keySize < 1024, \
|
|
EC keySize < 224, DES40_CBC, RC4_40, 3DES_EDE_CBC
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
# Legacy algorithms for Secure Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS)
|
|
# processing in JSSE implementation.
|
|
#
|
|
# In some environments, a certain algorithm may be undesirable but it
|
|
# cannot be disabled because of its use in legacy applications. Legacy
|
|
# algorithms may still be supported, but applications should not use them
|
|
# as the security strength of legacy algorithms are usually not strong enough
|
|
# in practice.
|
|
#
|
|
# During SSL/TLS security parameters negotiation, legacy algorithms will
|
|
# not be negotiated unless there are no other candidates.
|
|
#
|
|
# The syntax of the legacy algorithms string is described as this Java
|
|
# BNF-style:
|
|
# LegacyAlgorithms:
|
|
# " LegacyAlgorithm { , LegacyAlgorithm } "
|
|
#
|
|
# LegacyAlgorithm:
|
|
# AlgorithmName (standard JSSE algorithm name)
|
|
#
|
|
# See the specification of security property "jdk.certpath.disabledAlgorithms"
|
|
# for the syntax and description of the "AlgorithmName" notation.
|
|
#
|
|
# Per SSL/TLS specifications, cipher suites have the form:
|
|
# SSL_KeyExchangeAlg_WITH_CipherAlg_MacAlg
|
|
# or
|
|
# TLS_KeyExchangeAlg_WITH_CipherAlg_MacAlg
|
|
#
|
|
# For example, the cipher suite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uses RSA as the
|
|
# key exchange algorithm, AES_128_CBC (128 bits AES cipher algorithm in CBC
|
|
# mode) as the cipher (encryption) algorithm, and SHA-1 as the message digest
|
|
# algorithm for HMAC.
|
|
#
|
|
# The LegacyAlgorithm can be one of the following standard algorithm names:
|
|
# 1. JSSE cipher suite name, e.g., TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
|
|
# 2. JSSE key exchange algorithm name, e.g., RSA
|
|
# 3. JSSE cipher (encryption) algorithm name, e.g., AES_128_CBC
|
|
# 4. JSSE message digest algorithm name, e.g., SHA
|
|
#
|
|
# See SSL/TLS specifications and "Java Cryptography Architecture Standard
|
|
# Algorithm Name Documentation" for information about the algorithm names.
|
|
#
|
|
# Note: If a legacy algorithm is also restricted through the
|
|
# jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms property or the
|
|
# java.security.AlgorithmConstraints API (See
|
|
# javax.net.ssl.SSLParameters.setAlgorithmConstraints()),
|
|
# then the algorithm is completely disabled and will not be negotiated.
|
|
#
|
|
# Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation.
|
|
# It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
|
|
# There is no guarantee the property will continue to exist or be of the
|
|
# same syntax in future releases.
|
|
#
|
|
# Example:
|
|
# jdk.tls.legacyAlgorithms=DH_anon, DES_CBC, SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5
|
|
#
|
|
jdk.tls.legacyAlgorithms= \
|
|
K_NULL, C_NULL, M_NULL, \
|
|
DH_anon, ECDH_anon, \
|
|
RC4_128, RC4_40, DES_CBC, DES40_CBC, \
|
|
3DES_EDE_CBC
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
# The pre-defined default finite field Diffie-Hellman ephemeral (DHE)
|
|
# parameters for Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS/DTLS) processing.
|
|
#
|
|
# In traditional SSL/TLS/DTLS connections where finite field DHE parameters
|
|
# negotiation mechanism is not used, the server offers the client group
|
|
# parameters, base generator g and prime modulus p, for DHE key exchange.
|
|
# It is recommended to use dynamic group parameters. This property defines
|
|
# a mechanism that allows you to specify custom group parameters.
|
|
#
|
|
# The syntax of this property string is described as this Java BNF-style:
|
|
# DefaultDHEParameters:
|
|
# DefinedDHEParameters { , DefinedDHEParameters }
|
|
#
|
|
# DefinedDHEParameters:
|
|
# "{" DHEPrimeModulus , DHEBaseGenerator "}"
|
|
#
|
|
# DHEPrimeModulus:
|
|
# HexadecimalDigits
|
|
#
|
|
# DHEBaseGenerator:
|
|
# HexadecimalDigits
|
|
#
|
|
# HexadecimalDigits:
|
|
# HexadecimalDigit { HexadecimalDigit }
|
|
#
|
|
# HexadecimalDigit: one of
|
|
# 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F a b c d e f
|
|
#
|
|
# Whitespace characters are ignored.
|
|
#
|
|
# The "DefinedDHEParameters" defines the custom group parameters, prime
|
|
# modulus p and base generator g, for a particular size of prime modulus p.
|
|
# The "DHEPrimeModulus" defines the hexadecimal prime modulus p, and the
|
|
# "DHEBaseGenerator" defines the hexadecimal base generator g of a group
|
|
# parameter. It is recommended to use safe primes for the custom group
|
|
# parameters.
|
|
#
|
|
# If this property is not defined or the value is empty, the underlying JSSE
|
|
# provider's default group parameter is used for each connection.
|
|
#
|
|
# If the property value does not follow the grammar, or a particular group
|
|
# parameter is not valid, the connection will fall back and use the
|
|
# underlying JSSE provider's default group parameter.
|
|
#
|
|
# Note: This property is currently used by OpenJDK's JSSE implementation. It
|
|
# is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
|
|
#
|
|
# Example:
|
|
# jdk.tls.server.defaultDHEParameters=
|
|
# { \
|
|
# FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 \
|
|
# 29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD \
|
|
# EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 \
|
|
# E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED \
|
|
# EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 49286651 ECE65381 \
|
|
# FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF, 2}
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
# TLS key limits on symmetric cryptographic algorithms
|
|
#
|
|
# This security property sets limits on algorithms key usage in TLS 1.3.
|
|
# When the amount of data encrypted exceeds the algorithm value listed below,
|
|
# a KeyUpdate message will trigger a key change. This is for symmetric ciphers
|
|
# with TLS 1.3 only.
|
|
#
|
|
# The syntax for the property is described below:
|
|
# KeyLimits:
|
|
# " KeyLimit { , KeyLimit } "
|
|
#
|
|
# WeakKeyLimit:
|
|
# AlgorithmName Action Length
|
|
#
|
|
# AlgorithmName:
|
|
# A full algorithm transformation.
|
|
#
|
|
# Action:
|
|
# KeyUpdate
|
|
#
|
|
# Length:
|
|
# The amount of encrypted data in a session before the Action occurs
|
|
# This value may be an integer value in bytes, or as a power of two, 2^29.
|
|
#
|
|
# KeyUpdate:
|
|
# The TLS 1.3 KeyUpdate handshake process begins when the Length amount
|
|
# is fulfilled.
|
|
#
|
|
# Note: This property is currently used by OpenJDK's JSSE implementation. It
|
|
# is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
|
|
#
|
|
jdk.tls.keyLimits=AES/GCM/NoPadding KeyUpdate 2^37
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
# Cryptographic Jurisdiction Policy defaults
|
|
#
|
|
# Import and export control rules on cryptographic software vary from
|
|
# country to country. By default, Java provides two different sets of
|
|
# cryptographic policy files[1]:
|
|
#
|
|
# unlimited: These policy files contain no restrictions on cryptographic
|
|
# strengths or algorithms
|
|
#
|
|
# limited: These policy files contain more restricted cryptographic
|
|
# strengths
|
|
#
|
|
# The default setting is determined by the value of the "crypto.policy"
|
|
# Security property below. If your country or usage requires the
|
|
# traditional restrictive policy, the "limited" Java cryptographic
|
|
# policy is still available and may be appropriate for your environment.
|
|
#
|
|
# If you have restrictions that do not fit either use case mentioned
|
|
# above, Java provides the capability to customize these policy files.
|
|
# The "crypto.policy" security property points to a subdirectory
|
|
# within <java-home>/conf/security/policy/ which can be customized.
|
|
# Please see the <java-home>/conf/security/policy/README.txt file or consult
|
|
# the Java Security Guide/JCA documentation for more information.
|
|
#
|
|
# YOU ARE ADVISED TO CONSULT YOUR EXPORT/IMPORT CONTROL COUNSEL OR ATTORNEY
|
|
# TO DETERMINE THE EXACT REQUIREMENTS.
|
|
#
|
|
# [1] Please note that the JCE for Java SE, including the JCE framework,
|
|
# cryptographic policy files, and standard JCE providers provided with
|
|
# the Java SE, have been reviewed and approved for export as mass market
|
|
# encryption item by the US Bureau of Industry and Security.
|
|
#
|
|
# Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation.
|
|
# It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
|
|
#
|
|
crypto.policy=unlimited
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
# The policy for the XML Signature secure validation mode. The mode is
|
|
# enabled by setting the property "org.jcp.xml.dsig.secureValidation" to
|
|
# true with the javax.xml.crypto.XMLCryptoContext.setProperty() method,
|
|
# or by running the code with a SecurityManager.
|
|
#
|
|
# Policy:
|
|
# Constraint {"," Constraint }
|
|
# Constraint:
|
|
# AlgConstraint | MaxTransformsConstraint | MaxReferencesConstraint |
|
|
# ReferenceUriSchemeConstraint | KeySizeConstraint | OtherConstraint
|
|
# AlgConstraint
|
|
# "disallowAlg" Uri
|
|
# MaxTransformsConstraint:
|
|
# "maxTransforms" Integer
|
|
# MaxReferencesConstraint:
|
|
# "maxReferences" Integer
|
|
# ReferenceUriSchemeConstraint:
|
|
# "disallowReferenceUriSchemes" String { String }
|
|
# KeySizeConstraint:
|
|
# "minKeySize" KeyAlg Integer
|
|
# OtherConstraint:
|
|
# "noDuplicateIds" | "noRetrievalMethodLoops"
|
|
#
|
|
# For AlgConstraint, Uri is the algorithm URI String that is not allowed.
|
|
# See the XML Signature Recommendation for more information on algorithm
|
|
# URI Identifiers. For KeySizeConstraint, KeyAlg is the standard algorithm
|
|
# name of the key type (ex: "RSA"). If the MaxTransformsConstraint,
|
|
# MaxReferencesConstraint or KeySizeConstraint (for the same key type) is
|
|
# specified more than once, only the last entry is enforced.
|
|
#
|
|
# Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation. It
|
|
# is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
|
|
#
|
|
jdk.xml.dsig.secureValidationPolicy=\
|
|
disallowAlg http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-xslt-19991116,\
|
|
disallowAlg http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-md5,\
|
|
disallowAlg http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#hmac-md5,\
|
|
disallowAlg http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#md5,\
|
|
maxTransforms 5,\
|
|
maxReferences 30,\
|
|
disallowReferenceUriSchemes file http https,\
|
|
minKeySize RSA 1024,\
|
|
minKeySize DSA 1024,\
|
|
minKeySize EC 224,\
|
|
noDuplicateIds,\
|
|
noRetrievalMethodLoops
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
# Serialization process-wide filter
|
|
#
|
|
# A filter, if configured, is used by java.io.ObjectInputStream during
|
|
# deserialization to check the contents of the stream.
|
|
# A filter is configured as a sequence of patterns, each pattern is either
|
|
# matched against the name of a class in the stream or defines a limit.
|
|
# Patterns are separated by ";" (semicolon).
|
|
# Whitespace is significant and is considered part of the pattern.
|
|
#
|
|
# If the system property jdk.serialFilter is also specified, it supersedes
|
|
# the security property value defined here.
|
|
#
|
|
# If a pattern includes a "=", it sets a limit.
|
|
# If a limit appears more than once the last value is used.
|
|
# Limits are checked before classes regardless of the order in the
|
|
# sequence of patterns.
|
|
# If any of the limits are exceeded, the filter status is REJECTED.
|
|
#
|
|
# maxdepth=value - the maximum depth of a graph
|
|
# maxrefs=value - the maximum number of internal references
|
|
# maxbytes=value - the maximum number of bytes in the input stream
|
|
# maxarray=value - the maximum array length allowed
|
|
#
|
|
# Other patterns, from left to right, match the class or package name as
|
|
# returned from Class.getName.
|
|
# If the class is an array type, the class or package to be matched is the
|
|
# element type.
|
|
# Arrays of any number of dimensions are treated the same as the element type.
|
|
# For example, a pattern of "!example.Foo", rejects creation of any instance or
|
|
# array of example.Foo.
|
|
#
|
|
# If the pattern starts with "!", the status is REJECTED if the remaining
|
|
# pattern is matched; otherwise the status is ALLOWED if the pattern matches.
|
|
# If the pattern contains "/", the non-empty prefix up to the "/" is the
|
|
# module name;
|
|
# if the module name matches the module name of the class then
|
|
# the remaining pattern is matched with the class name.
|
|
# If there is no "/", the module name is not compared.
|
|
# If the pattern ends with ".**" it matches any class in the package and all
|
|
# subpackages.
|
|
# If the pattern ends with ".*" it matches any class in the package.
|
|
# If the pattern ends with "*", it matches any class with the pattern as a
|
|
# prefix.
|
|
# If the pattern is equal to the class name, it matches.
|
|
# Otherwise, the status is UNDECIDED.
|
|
#
|
|
#jdk.serialFilter=pattern;pattern
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
# RMI Registry Serial Filter
|
|
#
|
|
# The filter pattern uses the same format as jdk.serialFilter.
|
|
# This filter can override the builtin filter if additional types need to be
|
|
# allowed or rejected from the RMI Registry or to decrease limits but not
|
|
# to increase limits.
|
|
# If the limits (maxdepth, maxrefs, or maxbytes) are exceeded, the object is rejected.
|
|
#
|
|
# Each non-array type is allowed or rejected if it matches one of the patterns,
|
|
# evaluated from left to right, and is otherwise allowed. Arrays of any
|
|
# component type, including subarrays and arrays of primitives, are allowed.
|
|
#
|
|
# Array construction of any component type, including subarrays and arrays of
|
|
# primitives, are allowed unless the length is greater than the maxarray limit.
|
|
# The filter is applied to each array element.
|
|
#
|
|
# Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation.
|
|
# It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
|
|
#
|
|
# The built-in filter allows subclasses of allowed classes and
|
|
# can approximately be represented as the pattern:
|
|
#
|
|
#sun.rmi.registry.registryFilter=\
|
|
# maxarray=1000000;\
|
|
# maxdepth=20;\
|
|
# java.lang.String;\
|
|
# java.lang.Number;\
|
|
# java.lang.reflect.Proxy;\
|
|
# java.rmi.Remote;\
|
|
# sun.rmi.server.UnicastRef;\
|
|
# sun.rmi.server.RMIClientSocketFactory;\
|
|
# sun.rmi.server.RMIServerSocketFactory;\
|
|
# java.rmi.activation.ActivationID;\
|
|
# java.rmi.server.UID
|
|
#
|
|
# RMI Distributed Garbage Collector (DGC) Serial Filter
|
|
#
|
|
# The filter pattern uses the same format as jdk.serialFilter.
|
|
# This filter can override the builtin filter if additional types need to be
|
|
# allowed or rejected from the RMI DGC.
|
|
#
|
|
# Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation.
|
|
# It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
|
|
#
|
|
# The builtin DGC filter can approximately be represented as the filter pattern:
|
|
#
|
|
#sun.rmi.transport.dgcFilter=\
|
|
# java.rmi.server.ObjID;\
|
|
# java.rmi.server.UID;\
|
|
# java.rmi.dgc.VMID;\
|
|
# java.rmi.dgc.Lease;\
|
|
# maxdepth=5;maxarray=10000
|
|
|
|
# CORBA ORBIorTypeCheckRegistryFilter
|
|
# Type check enhancement for ORB::string_to_object processing
|
|
#
|
|
# An IOR type check filter, if configured, is used by an ORB during
|
|
# an ORB::string_to_object invocation to check the veracity of the type encoded
|
|
# in the ior string.
|
|
#
|
|
# The filter pattern consists of a semi-colon separated list of class names.
|
|
# The configured list contains the binary class names of the IDL interface types
|
|
# corresponding to the IDL stub class to be instantiated.
|
|
# As such, a filter specifies a list of IDL stub classes that will be
|
|
# allowed by an ORB when an ORB::string_to_object is invoked.
|
|
# It is used to specify a white list configuration of acceptable
|
|
# IDL stub types which may be contained in a stringified IOR
|
|
# parameter passed as input to an ORB::string_to_object method.
|
|
#
|
|
# Note: This property is currently used by the JDK Reference implementation.
|
|
# It is not guaranteed to be examined and used by other implementations.
|
|
#
|
|
#com.sun.CORBA.ORBIorTypeCheckRegistryFilter=binary_class_name;binary_class_name
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
# JCEKS Encrypted Key Serial Filter
|
|
#
|
|
# This filter, if configured, is used by the JCEKS KeyStore during the
|
|
# deserialization of the encrypted Key object stored inside a key entry.
|
|
# If not configured or the filter result is UNDECIDED (i.e. none of the patterns
|
|
# matches), the filter configured by jdk.serialFilter will be consulted.
|
|
#
|
|
# If the system property jceks.key.serialFilter is also specified, it supersedes
|
|
# the security property value defined here.
|
|
#
|
|
# The filter pattern uses the same format as jdk.serialFilter. The default
|
|
# pattern allows java.lang.Enum, java.security.KeyRep, java.security.KeyRep$Type,
|
|
# and javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec and rejects all the others.
|
|
jceks.key.serialFilter = java.base/java.lang.Enum;java.base/java.security.KeyRep;\
|
|
java.base/java.security.KeyRep$Type;java.base/javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec;!*
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
# Enhanced exception message information
|
|
#
|
|
# By default, exception messages should not include potentially sensitive
|
|
# information such as file names, host names, or port numbers. This property
|
|
# accepts one or more comma separated values, each of which represents a
|
|
# category of enhanced exception message information to enable. Values are
|
|
# case-insensitive. Leading and trailing whitespaces, surrounding each value,
|
|
# are ignored. Unknown values are ignored.
|
|
#
|
|
# NOTE: Use caution before setting this property. Setting this property
|
|
# exposes sensitive information in Exceptions, which could, for example,
|
|
# propagate to untrusted code or be emitted in stack traces that are
|
|
# inadvertently disclosed and made accessible over a public network.
|
|
#
|
|
# The categories are:
|
|
#
|
|
# hostInfo - IOExceptions thrown by java.net.Socket and the socket types in the
|
|
# java.nio.channels package will contain enhanced exception
|
|
# message information
|
|
#
|
|
# The property setting in this file can be overridden by a system property of
|
|
# the same name, with the same syntax and possible values.
|
|
#
|
|
#jdk.includeInExceptions=hostInfo
|